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Purpose of this paper In this paper, information security assessment 
is analysed in terms of cultural categories and 
virtue ethics, in order to explain the cultural 
origin of certain types of security 
vulnerabilities, as well as to enable a proactive 
attitude towards preventing such 
vulnerabilities. 
Design/methodology/approach Vulnerabilities in information security are 
compared to the concept of “monster” 
introduced by Martijntje Smits in philosophy 
of technology. The applicability of different 
strategies for dealing with monsters to 
information security is discussed, and the 
strategies are linked to attitudes in virtue 
ethics. 
Findings It is concluded that the present approach can 
form the basis for dealing proactively with 





The research presented here does not define a 
stepwise approach for implementation of the 
recommended strategy in practice. This is 
future work. 
Practical implications  
(if applicable) 
The results of this paper enable computer 
experts to rethink their attitude towards 
security threats, thereby reshaping their 
practices. 
What is original/value of paper The paper provides an alternative 
anthropological framework for descriptive and 
normative analysis of information security 
problems, which does not rely on the 
objectivity of risk. 
  
 





1 Introduction  
 
Information security can be defined as the practice that deals with protecting information 
systems against attacks. It typically concerns technical means to avoid or eliminate security 
vulnerabilities in information system design. Such vulnerabilities form a special type of risk. 
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Rather than covering events in the natural environment, these risks are associated with 
intentional human action: an attacker may exploit a vulnerability in an information system to 
disrupt the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information. 
 
As vulnerabilities can be classified as risks, the problems associated with risk assessment also 
apply to information security. How can we anticipate risks in the design of the technology, if 
we may never have seen similar risks before? How likely are the associated future events? Can 
risk be expressed objectively at all? Such philosophical questions about risk have been around 
for a while (see e.g. Shrader-Frechette, 1990; Cross, 1992; Jasanoff, 1998). These questions 
have also been discussed in the context of a critique of classic theories of technology 
assessment, where it is pointed out that either the future has too many variables to allow for 
accurate (or even approximate) predictions of the future, or that models fail to take into 
account the complexity of the social embedding (Adams, 1995; Bradbury, 1989; Pursell, 
1979). 
 
With the emergence of the new field of information security, the objectivity of risk and security 
is still often implicitly assumed (Pieters, 2006; see for example Evans and Paul, 2004; 
Nikander and Karvonen, 2000; Oostveen and Van den Besselaar, 2004; Riedl, 2004; Xenakis 
and Macintosh, 2005), but similar questions can be asked about the uncertainty involved in 
assessing these variables. The possibility of intentional behavior by an attacker to make the 
system fail - characteristic of security as opposed to safety - increases the uncertainty in the 
case of security, because predicting what humans may do is thought to be different from 
predicting what nature may do. There is a double contingency, and the vulnerabilities game is 
an act of communication between attackers and defenders (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 103-136). 
 
Such discussions about the objectivity of risks have consequences for the possibility of 
developing an information security ethics. They make a consequentialist approach problematic, 
since the high level of uncertainty involved makes it easy to deny the relation between action 
and consequence, and thereby to avoid responsibility. Security assessment is nevertheless an 
inescapable necessity, and it is therefore necessary to put forward a framework which makes it 
possible to describe security practices and ethics without relying on the objectivity of risk 
assessment. At the same time, the framework needs to be proactive, meaning that the model 
should not only be useful to assess and explain past problems, but also suitable for preparing 
for future attacks. 
 
In this paper, we will make the case for virtue ethics as suitable framework. We investigate the 
scientific endeavor of information security as a cultural phenomenon, and from this 
perspective, our main question is how participants in this community can and should deal with 
uncertain risks. We employ existing theories from the anthropological perspective to develop a 
descriptive as well as a normative framework to discuss the attitudes towards vulnerabilities in 
the information security community, and illustrate the approach with examples from the field. 
 
Rather than describing which types of flaws exist, which can also be helpful in analyzing the 
domain of information security (see e.g. Landwehr et al., 1994), we focus on why humans 
were unable to prevent them. We will introduce the concept of “cultural category” as a useful 
basis for understanding the difficulties of security assessment. We will then show how certain 
types of vulnerabilities can be interpreted in terms of clashes of categories. This allows us to 
give an explanatory account of such vulnerabilities, and to address the question of how we 
should handle (moral) responsibility and accountability within information security from the 
point of view of virtue theory. To achieve this, we will describe how the emerging “monsters” 
can be dealt with, and how these dealing strategies can be linked to character traits in the 
context of virtue theory.  
 
2 Vulnerabilities as monsters  
 
Cultural categories are classifications that help us describe and understand the world. The 
concept has been used by Mary Douglas in her anthropological analysis of impurity and danger 
(Douglas, [1966] 1994). Impure and dangerous are those phenomena that do not fit into a 
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cultural scheme of classification of the beings in the world. In this sense, dirt is “matter out of 
place” in the system of cultural categories. Some African tribes considered twins as monsters, 
because, according to these categories, only animals produced more than one child, and twins 
thus had both human and animal traits. These “monsters” can come into being when cultural 
categories are inadequate to fit phenomena. Douglas held the view that this analysis applies to 
modern society as well as traditional societies. 
 
Martijntje Smits (2002a; 2002b; 2006) argues that controversies surrounding the introduction 
of new technologies can often be explained in terms of such a clash between cultural 
categories. Here, again, danger and impurity are associated with a classification failure. For 
example, we may think of genetically manipulated food as an (unacceptable?) mixture of 
nature and culture. Smits argues that the concept of “monster” can be applied to controversies 
on new technologies as well, and proposes the term “monster theory” for a method of analysis 
of these issues. Smits argues (2002b, p. 143, our translation):  
 
 From the monster theory it follows that waste and dangers are inevitable, because 
 they are unintended by-products of cultural category classifications. On the borders of 
 these classifications, ambiguities appear, that may, among other things, manifest 
 themselves as monsters.  
 
The latter happens when the ambiguity is experienced negatively, and cannot be resolved 
easily. The term “monster” can be understood by reference to monsters in stories and films, 
which often combine elements of different categories as well (Csicsery-Ronay, 2002). 
 
We propose to generalize the concept of “cultural category” by using it not only in the broad 
context of the whole of society, as Smits does, but also in reference to practices pertaining to 
specific groups or “subcultures”. By “subculture” we understand in the context of this paper a 
group that can be identified as sharing some basic characteristics, like for example religious 
beliefs, moral standings, or professional occupation, in other words properties that determine 
the generalized “cultural categories” that they share. This allows us to apply the monster 
theory to the specific domain of information security.  
 
As an aside, we should note that the way in which we use the concept of cultural category 
bears a passing resemblance to the “paradigm” idea developed by Kuhn (1964). However, 
while a paradigm shift is a rather dramatic event, in which the accumulation of anomalies leads 
to the abrupt replacement of a world view during a “revolutionary” period, the way in which 
categories react to monsters does not require or imply such a mechanism. This will become 
clear in the following sections. 
 
In our case we focus on information security and propose that there is a strong analogy 
between the model proposed by Smits and the inherent fallibility of security assessment: 
security assessment can also be explained in terms of cultural categories, and phenomena that 
do not fit in these categories. Spectacular attacks on computer systems, having a major 
impact on the practice of security, often occur when the vulnerability does not fit into the 
existing categories of computer security. Therefore, we argue that at least some of the 
vulnerabilities emerging in computer security can be characterized as monsters. As much as 
society will always produce waste and dangers because of existing categories, computer 
security will always produce vulnerabilities because of existing security models. 
 
On an even smaller scale, the cultural categories within a company may produce vulnerabilities 
in their information systems, when phenomena are not covered by the cultural categories of 
the company. To the outside world, the phenomenon appears as a failure, a mistake by the 
company in relation to the existing categories. However, from the company's perspective, the 
vulnerability may present a true challenge to their categories, and therefore appear as a 
monster. The company may not only have failed to address the vulnerability, it may not even 
have been able to see it, because it did not fit in their categories.  
 
This analysis does not imply that the first attack of a certain type is always the most 
successful. It takes time to adapt when a challenge to the cultural categories is presented, and 
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therefore new attacks may be very similar to ones that were already known, but still be very 
successful (Kienzle and Elder, 2003). It is also important to stress that from this analysis it 
follows that “mistakes”, understood as errors due to poor judgment or misapplication of 
knowledge, such as programming errors, are not to be categorized as monsters. These do not 
result from an inherent impossibility within the subculture to make sense of the phenomenon 
with their categories. Instead, they reveal a misapplication of existing categories. This also 
holds for errors due to time constraints, and ultimately money (Anderson, 2001). Something is 
only a “monster” if it is a classification failure. In the following, we will focus on such 
monstrous vulnerabilities. 
  
3 Two examples of the clash of categories 
 
A typical example of a clash of categories in computer security was the issue of viruses in 
Microsoft Word documents (Ford, 1996; Gordon and Ford, 1995). Up to a certain point in time, 
viruses were supposed to hide in executable files only, not in documents. Then, a virus was 
created that was capable of affecting Microsoft Word documents: the Concept virus. It was 
relatively harmless and meant to demonstrate the possibility of macro virus creation (Wallich, 
1995). A more recent and infamous example of virus exploiting macros in Word is the Melissa 
virus (Garber, 1999).  
 
It is interesting to note that both Garber and Wallich identify these viruses as barrier-breaking 
and radically new objects. In our framework, we can affirm that the viruses in Word 
documents were a clever example of the mixing of two cultural categories in computer science: 
those of programs and data. Virus scanners were supposed to focus on programs, not data. As 
a result, a vulnerability emerged that was not recognized as such: it was “matter out of place” 
in the category system. A monster had been created. The “success” of Melissa shows that 
monsters may continue to exist, even after they have been unveiled years ago. 
 
The observations that categories may be imperfect and that many people are aware of their 
limitations do not invalidate this argument. Even if people are aware of the limitations of the 
classes in the animal kingdom, the platypus may still be considered a “monster” when it is first 
discovered. In the same sense, computer scientists may be well aware of the limitations of the 
distinction between programs and data, but still develop their products from the perspective of 
this separation, and therefore be shocked when something shows up that challenges these 
classes. This is because even when people are aware of the limitations of the categories, they 
still need them as a basis for communicating in their subculture. And even if the developers of 
the macro-using software are aware that this feature constitutes a risk, the risk may not be 
perceived in the same way by the virus protection developers. Following the monster theory, 
any classification in computer science that affects or models security is therefore bound to 
create vulnerabilities as by-products that exploit the limits of the classification. In this sense, 
the conceptual separation of programs and data produced the text document viruses.  
 
A second example is the separation of the hardware level and the software level in smart-
cards. Normally, security models addressed either the software or the hardware, but not both. 
This enabled the power analysis attack, in which data (software) could be read by 
eavesdropping on the power consumption of the card (hardware) (Messerges et al., 2002). In 
one implementation, attacks are based on side-channel information gained by observing cache 
bits and misses in the current drawn by the smart card (Fournier and Turnstall, 2006). This, in 
turn, generated research on how to repair the vulnerability (Herbst et al., 2006). Tempest 
attacks, involving eavesdropping on information by capturing electromagnetic radiation 
emitted by electronic devices, are of a similar type. Although the possibility is well-known in 
military circles, it had not been thought of in the Dutch electronic voting regulation (Pieters 
and Van Haren, 2007). A British report on electronic voting did mention it (Fairweather and 
Rogerson, 2002). 
 
An interesting question is who is responsible for such clashes. In case of the viruses in Word 
documents, was it Microsoft, which allowed macros to be executed in Word documents? Was it 
the virus writer, who exploited this feature in order to attack systems? Or was it the computer 
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science community, whose classifications were not suitable for all types of files? Different 
levels of responsibility can (and should) be identified. Of course, from a legal perspective, the 
virus writers are responsible for the problems involved. The Melissa virus writer has some 
moral responsibility as he willingly chose to write code for malignant purposes (Bissett, 2000), 
but this does not mean that we cannot discuss other responsibilities from an ethical 
perspective here. Also in the case of power analysis, we can pose the responsibility question in 
a way parallel to the Melissa example. 
 
In both examples we can thus identify several levels of responsibility. We propose that, on a 
more fundamental level, the cultural categories themselves are responsible for providing the 
opportunities for attack. The community was inherently incapable of preparing itself for the 
new attacks, because their cultural categories excluded precisely the phenomenon that 
appeared, just as a categorization of animals may exclude the platypus. Such vulnerabilities 
can be understood as monsters. This observation allows us to put forward an approach for 
understanding the moral responsibilities and ethical attitudes of the security experts involved, 
in terms of their attitudes towards challenges to existing cultural categories. 
 
4 Monsters and responsibilities 
 
Based on the analysis and the examples of the previous sections, we aim at linking the 
descriptive analysis of practical reactions to and decisions on vulnerabilities, provided by 
application of the monster theory, with moral traits and moral responsibilities, yielding a 
normative view on the daily practice of computer security experts. We will first discuss the 
ethical approach taken. 
 
The issue of moral responsibility of IT professionals is usually framed in the literature by 
discussing the issue whether computers create novel moral issues or, rather, reframe existing 
issues (Johnson, 2003; Johnson and Nissenbaum, 1994). Specifically referring to computer 
security, Nissenbaum and Felton (2002) have argued that new problems arise. Floridi (1999) 
focuses on the specific moral issues associated with information entities. Here, however, we 
are interested in the information security expert rather than the specific properties of the IT 
environment.  
 
In information security, practitioners are dealing with situations with a high level of 
uncertainty. Moreover, the specific problems we focus on in this paper occur precisely when 
the existing cultural categories are insufficient to express the situation. In such settings, not all 
ethical frameworks are suitable. Approaches like deontology or utilitarianism take the agent as 
given and concentrate on other factors such as moral laws or consequences, which may be 
impossible to assess in such situations. By contrast, virtue ethics focuses precisely on 
character traits and dispositions of the agent, and can be used to define attitudes towards 
problems that involve a high degree of uncertainty. 
 
For this reason, we express the link between reactions to monsters and ethical attitudes in 
terms of virtue theory (see Bowen (2000) for an example of an application in the context of 
computer science). In this approach, the focus lies not so much in a theoretical framework that 
can be used to analyze moral choices, but on attitudes of character (virtues and flaws), aiming 
at describing how to “live a good life” and be a “good human being”. The basic question we 
should be asking when dealing with ethical matters is for virtue ethics not: “What ought I do?”, 
but rather: “What kind of person ought I be?” One of us has argued elsewhere (Consoli, 2008) 
that professional conduct issues might greatly benefit from a virtue-theoretical approach, in 
that it helps eliminate the mismatch between externally imposed rules and the living morality 
of the community of practitioners. 
 
Before proceeding, we must specify which model of virtue theory we have in mind. Virtue 
theory goes as far back as Aristotle (see Bowen, 2000), but has been revived in recent times 
by a number of authors (Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 2001; Hursthouse, 2006; Nussbaum et al., 
1993) in very different contexts. We are concerned here with the formulation due to Alasdair 
MacIntyre (MacIntyre, [1981] 2007). There are two main reasons for choosing this approach in 
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our attempt to link strategies for dealing with monsters with moral attitudes of security 
experts. 
 
Firstly, MacIntyre introduces the notion of practice (Macintyre, [1981] 2007, p.187): 
 
 By a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
 established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that  
 form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
 excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
 with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions  
 of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. 
 
This notion of practice provides a way to link the activities within a subculture (as a practice 
with both individual practitioners and their communal interests and standards) directly with its 
moral significance, which is our goal. In fact, the activities characteristic of the practice are 
explicitly oriented at achieving a moral goal, namely the “standards of excellence”. 
Furthermore, both the individual and the community level are considered: a practice is a form 
of “socially established co-operative human activity” and only a common effort of the 
practitioners van lead to the extension of the “human powers”. 
 
Secondly, MacIntyre looks for a way to give a “unitary core concept” of virtues (MacIntyre, 
[1981] 2007, p. 186). On the one hand, he says, we must recognize the relativity of the single 
virtues (or even what we take as constituting a virtue) on the historical and social context; on 
the other hand, the different account of virtues share (form) a tradition which has a conceptual 
unity. This approach provides the notion of virtue with a conceptual robustness that makes the 
situation-boundness of our analysis (even more so in a fast-changing field as the one of 
information technologies) not a weakness, but a reliable starting point to investigate moral 
responsibilities. In other words, the link we make between strategies and virtues does not 
purport to be absolute, but does claim to be embedded in a tradition which makes it at the 
same time recognizable and usable (because of its recognizability). 
 
An added value of choosing virtue theory as our analysis tools is that, besides describing the 
situation, it can also provide the proactivity we referred to earlier in the paper. In other words, 
by linking monster-dealing strategies with virtues, it becomes possible for the security expert 
to be prepared for the future, and to deal efficiently with challenges that must yet be fully 
conceptualized. 
 
5 Strategies and virtues 
 
Smits (2002a; 2002b; 2006) considers four different ways of dealing with monsters: 
embracing, expelling, adapting, and assimilating. In this section, we investigate the extent to 
which they can be used for dealing with vulnerabilities in computer security as well. We also 
address the question how these strategies relate to basic ethical attitudes of the experts as 
individuals and the community as a whole. This allows us to evaluate the desirability of the 
different combinations of strategies and attitudes. 
 
Before proceeding, we wish to stress the explorative character of the following analysis, and 
the need for more specific further research, as to the knowledge of the authors there has been 
very little research carried out in the field of virtue theory applied to computer security. 
Furthermore, the examples do not always represent the attitude of the community as a whole, 
as subcultures exist also within the information security community. In particular, there is 
often a gap between the attitude of industry professionals and the scientific community, 
especially when a company’s view is mediated by its economic interests. The examples are 
thus only meant to explain possible attitudes. 
 
 
Embracing as respect  
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Embracing the monster (for example, as if it were a wonder) may be interpreted as a sign of 
respect. During the introduction of plastics, some people thought this new material would be 
some kind of salvation from the limitations of nature (Smits, 2002b, p. 161). Thus, there is the 
possibility of admiring phenomena incompatible with the existing cultural order, and granting 
them a kind of holy status. 
 
In computer security, this means granting a vulnerability, an inconsistency, the status of a 
kind of ultimate proof of the rightness of the existing order. In a way, this can be seen in the 
reaction of a Dutch voting machine manufacturer (Nedap) to the easy replacement of chips in 
their system by a pressure group: “We noticed that it was proved that the machine works 
excellently. The voting machine does exactly what is commanded.” Thus, if the attackers make 
the system count incorrectly, this proves that the system is correct. This is the “it's not a bug, 
it's a feature” approach, often induced by commercial interests: it is not a monster, it's a 
normal animal. It is not a problem with our categories; it is a problem with your categorization 
of the phenomenon. 
 
This attitude is a form of respect, in which something is accepted without questioning. Respect 
can be useful in many situations, since it is impractical to question everything one encounters. 
As such, respect helps to maintain the existing category system, which helps us to deal with 
our environment in a practical way. The question is if this has to be considered a virtue for a 
computer security expert. Seeing a vulnerability as a confirmation of the existing order does 
not solve the problem, at least not from the point of view of the people who see it as a failure. 
Because security is inherently occupied with future events and unknown phenomena, respect 
for the monster stands in the way of dealing with it in a way which is effective for the security 
practice. 
 
We can conclude that embracing is not a “virtuous” attitude for the community of practitioners 
and should therefore be discarded as a way of conduct. It is interesting to notice how, in the 
context of our analysis, the notion of respect – which is almost universally considered a virtue 
– turns out not to be a favorable or even positive attitude. In that sense, we see how the 
tradition within which virtues are embedded is constitutive of the virtues themselves. What is 
highly commendable in a situation, must be steered clear of in another one. 
 
In fact, respect as attitude may happen (and even be appropriate) among hackers. They see a  
vulnerability they discover as a confirmation of their own place in the order of things, which is 
a “monstrous” place: a place which constantly seeks the border of existing categories 
(Nissenbaum, 2004). In this context, respect is not only commendable, but it also contributes 
to the self-definition of hackers. 
 
 
Expelling as denial  
 
Some people regarded plastics not as salvation, but as a disaster. Precisely the failure to fit 
existing classifications of materials made them filthy and dangerous. Luddites think such new 
technologies should be expelled or even destroyed (Smits, 2002b, pp. 149-150). 
 
Expelling the vulnerability-as-monster in computer security is in a practical way not feasible, 
because a threat to a computer system cannot be eliminated as easily as a new phenomenon 
in society, since the attacker is typically outside the control of the computer security 
community. There is an extra contingency here in the behavior of the enemy, who is 
committed to exploiting the monster. Where technological monsters in society are expelled by 
saying “we don't want this”, vulnerabilities-as-monsters are expelled by saying “there is no 
problem”. Diebold Election Systems used this strategy when they were accused of 
vulnerabilities in their voting machines (Gumbel, 2005, p. 260) as opposed to the Nedap 
reaction above. It might help to deny the problem and see if everything stays quiet, 
particularly because public perception of vulnerabilities makes it more likely that they are 
exploited. 
 
Although the attitude of Diebold can not be considered typical for the behavior of security 
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experts (they are a commercial party with an economic interest), it makes nonetheless clear 
that such a take on the vulnerabilities problem cannot possibly be productive for a proactive 
attitude in the security community. From an ethical point of view, this disposition can be 
interpreted as one of denial towards the problem, as a way of not having to commit oneself to 
a choice and a course of action. Again, denial may be appropriate in situations where one has 
too many problems to deal with all of them, or even when the definition of a problem seems to 
be unreasonable. As in the case of respect, this attitude helps to maintain the existing 
categories, because problems with these are put aside. However, as dealing with future 
problems is constitutive of the information security practice, denial cannot be considered a 
virtue in this context. Context-dependence plays again a crucial role, exactly as one would 
expect from a virtue-ethical approach. In the case of computer security, leaving a monster 
arising from a category clash alone is often not only unfeasible, but counter-productive. 
 
 
Adaptation as perseverance 
 
Biodegradable plastics are an adaptation of the monstrous plastics to existing categories: they 
will no longer fail to rot when lying around (Smits, 2002b, p. 155; 2006, p. 501). In the 
strategy of adaptation, monsters are redefined such that they are compatible with existing 
categories. 
 
Adapting vulnerabilities-as-monsters may be useful as well, for example by categorizing  
Word documents as executable files rather than data files, which was done in virus scanners. 
In such an approach, the threat becomes one of a known category: a virus in an executable 
file. In other words, the category stays fixed and the object is re-categorized. 
 
From a virtue ethics point of view this reaction can be categorized as a form of perseverance, 
which denotes a) continuing a process and b) doing so despite difficulties. In this particular 
case, the difficulties are the monsters, and perseverance means trying not to compromise too 
much one's own world view by forcing the world to fit in it. Perseverance accepts that the 
existing categories may be imperfect, but refuses to change them based on new phenomena. 
Instead, it is said that “y is just another x”. Even in this case, perseverance is not inherently 
“bad”, because stable categories exist to create stable communities, and allow members to 
learn to avoid mistakes in their application. It could therefore be argued that such a strategy 
could be useful for information security experts in dealing with vulnerabilities. However, one of 
the priorities of information security is prevention and, in that sense, perseverance as a 
disposition does not seem to provide the proactive attitude which is required in order to 
prevent new security threats. 
 
Moreover, the adaptation approach presupposes a unidirectional relation between categories 
and the phenomena they explain. Categories are given, and vulnerabilities have to fit into 
these categories to allow protection. This does not do justice to the complex and dynamical 
process in which vulnerabilities emerge in information systems. The approach cannot be 
generalized to deal with security problems, and we can see this in the virus vulnerability. The 
challenges of viruses in different file types, in the end, have not left the categories of virus 
protection unaffected, and we can now do “full scans”, “smart scans”, etcetera. Thus, the 
categories have been changed as well. 
 
Up to now, we have tried to link three of the monster-dealing strategies with dispositions of 
character. However, respect, denial and perseverance are all ethical attitudes that are helpful 
in maintaining existing categories. Although these strategies may be useful to prevent 
“accidental” vulnerabilities introduced by mistakes or constraints in terms of time or budget, it 
became clear that these dispositions do not provide the security expert and her community 
with a useful attitude to deal with the monstrous vulnerability, because in this case it is the 
categories themselves that are being challenged. Since information security should, by its very 
nature, be prepared for unknown future threats, they may not even be virtuous within the 




Integration as open-mindedness and courage 
 
The last strategy Smits mentions is assimilating the monster, a pragmatic process in which 
both the monster and the cultural categories are being changed. Because the word 
“assimilation” seems to imply that something is made to fit rather than a mutual convergence 
process, we rather use “integration” instead. An example that Smits mentions is the shifting of 
the border between alive and dead due to the technology of organ donation. Here, “brain-
dead” became a new criterion for deciding whether it would be allowed to remove usable 
organs from a body. Thus, a new category emerged for dealing with the new technology 
(Smits, 2002b, p. 159; 2006, p. 501). 
 
Integration also happens in information security. In vulnerabilities-as-monsters, power 
analysis attacks on smart-cards now have their own field of research, and the power-analysis 
vulnerability has changed from a side-effect to something that can be prevented using 
appropriate tools. This means that both the categories and the technology have been changed, 
by integrating the monster of power analysis attacks. 
 
From a virtue ethics point of view, the attitude of integrating the monster is related to the 
epistemic virtue of open-mindedness (Montmarquet, 2008). In order to change one’s world 
view for new phenomena to fit in, such effort of flexibility of thought is required. Only when 
such effort is made, it becomes possible to change the categories of thinking themselves. This 
is not sufficient by itself, though, since a motivational attitude is also required to actually use 
the open-mindedness in a specific context, in this case information security. 
 
The motivation behind the open-mindedness can be related to the virtue of courage. Courage 
is a motivational virtue, as opposed to open-mindedness, which is an epistemic one 
(Montmarquet, 2008). In this context, we understand courage as a disposition of willingness to 
confront uncertainty or danger. As Mary Douglas showed, uncertainty and danger are closely 
related, precisely through the cultural categories we discussed earlier. Fixed categories provide 
humans with a sense of safety, and it therefore requires courage to subject those to 
challenges. In the context of information security, this also means that one may need to 
reduce one’s own (epistemic) certainty in order to increase the security of the information 
systems one designs, and thereby the certainty of other people. 
 
The virtue of courage may also be extended beyond the level of the individual. Even if 
individual open-mindedness and courage may allow one to identify challenges to the existing 
cultural categories, and thereby create the possibility to prevent vulnerabilities, lack of these 
virtues within the subculture may still prevent action. Thus, although our starting point is 
epistemic and individual, the fact that knowledge is embedded in the practice of information 
security requires not only open-mindedness at the individual level, but also the courage to 
change the practice itself. 
 
Regarding assimilation this way, we are provided with the grounds we need for a proactive 
attitude towards security, which was missing in the adaptation strategy. Members of the 
computer security community are not only responsible for formalizing all aspects of existing 
categories, but rather for contributing to the evolution of the categories themselves, both 
individually and within the practice, so that they are better able to incorporate new 
phenomena, and thereby prevent new attacks. But this last step involves a definite amount of 
courage in the sense we defined above. Moreover, this courage can not be limited to one 
individual, but must be attained in a collective effort, through which the standards of 
excellence can be achieved. When acting courageously as a community, then, security experts 
form a practice in the full sense of the Macintyrean definition. 
 
 
6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
The treatment of deviant phenomena in a culture is a field of research with a long tradition. 
Based on the theories of Mary Douglas on impurity, danger and risk, Martijntje Smits analyzes 
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how our culture takes care of new technological phenomena. She calls this approach “monster 
theory”. We argue that this theory does not only make sense on a broad cultural level, but also 
within subcultures. These subcultures have their own sets of specific cultural categories. 
 
We have proposed to adapt the monster theory to the practice of computer security. This 
enables us to frame the discussion about the meaning of new threats and the way to react to 
them in terms of strategies for dealing with monsters. The strategies that Smits distinguishes 
are embracing, expelling, adapting and assimilating. These can be used to describe reactions 
to vulnerabilities-as-monsters in information systems. Smits considers the assimilation 
strategy, which we prefer to call integration, the most promising one, since it does not 
consider the cultural categories as fixed and given. We argue that integration is also the best 
strategy in computer security as a subculture, for there is no final model of information 
security that incorporates all vulnerabilities, as there is no final set of cultural categories that 
fits all phenomena. 
 
We have furthermore proposed to view the different strategies as linked to ethical attitudes in 
the context of virtue ethics à la Macintyre. We believe that this helps to re-conceptualize the 
discussion about responsibilities of (computer) scientists in a productive way. From a virtue 
ethics point of view, the strategy of integration requires both epistemic and motivational 
virtues. A certain amount of both open-mindedness and courage is desirable for members of 
the information security community to achieve the “standards of excellence ... appropriate to 
... that form of activity”. Also within this perspective, integration turns out to be the most 
“virtuous” strategy. While the virtues associated with the other strategies may be helpful in 
specific situations, the relation of information security with the future and with attackers 
makes it necessary to be epistemically adaptive and have the willingness to confront the 
associated uncertainty. There is currently much research in a broad range of fields about the 
modern significance of courage as a virtue (Chun, 2005; Kateb, 2004; Schwartz, 2004). This 
paper aims to be a contribution to this discussion within the field of computer security. 
 
Having made a case for open-mindedness and courage as the most virtuous dispositions 
security experts can deploy in order to deal with monsters, we are still faced with a crucial 
question: how can these virtues be translated into practice? How should open-mindedness and 
courage be operationalized in order to make it possible to go beyond established categories? 
This paper does not purport to give a stepwise approach for proactively identifying potential 
monsters, as its scope is to point at an alternative perspective on computer security and to 
give an exploratory account. Nevertheless, two suggestions can be made, which will have to be 
worked out in future work. Firstly, great emphasis on virtues should be put at the educational 
level. Teaching character may seem a strange endeavor, but virtue ethics shows that it is a 
feasible way (Hartman 2006). Virtuous attitudes can be taught in a biographical way, i.e. by 
using exemplary tales which are not only descriptive, but can help leverage our knowledge to 
deal with future situations (Consoli, in preparation). 
 
Secondly, risk assessment methods should somehow reflect the attitudes of open-mindedness 
and courage. Information security experts already point out the need for “out-of-the-box” 
thinking in information risk assessment in personal communication. Also, on the lower level of 
organizational knowledge, many security incidents are related to “unknown unknowns”: 
phenomena that are not reflected in the organization’s categorization of its assets (Baker et 
al., 2008). This means that the need for open-mindedness and courage seems to be 
acknowledged within the community. “Out-of-the-box” may indeed be a good concept to 
denote precisely this combination of virtues: “out-of-the-box” is associated both with 
transcending existing conceptualizations and with the motivation that makes this possible. 
However, incorporating such proactive monster taming in risk assessment methods seems to 
be a contradictio in terminis, since monsters are by definition not included in existing 
categories, and can therefore not be part of a risk assessment process. How to resolve this 
paradox is an interesting topic for future research. 
 
As a final remark, the notion of monster can be seen as a tool for information security experts 
to focus on “what is in there” next to “what is out there”. If information security, and risk 
assessment in general, aim at better understanding of future phenomena, they cannot ignore 
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their own culture. For it may not be objective nature that they are investigating, but their own 
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